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L
ife is dramatically better for the typical
American born in 2000 than for someone
born in 1850. A child born in 2000 can
expect to live seventy-seven years on
average. Survival to a first birthday is
taken for granted: 99.4 percent of new-
borns reach age one. Education is likely to continue
beyond high school, lasting more than thirteen
years on average, and work life does not begin until
age twenty. These statistics merely summarize pat-
terns that are apparent from casual observation.
They also provide a useful way to compare life
today to life in 1850. A child born in 1850 could
expect to live forty years, only slightly more than
half the expected lifetime today. Only 85 percent of
babies lived until their first birthday. Childhood was
short, with a typical child staying in school only
three years and starting work by age nine.
The transition from these conditions in 1850 to
conditions today has been gradual and persistent.
With little variation, this transition is consistent
with changes in people’s lives in much of Western
Europe, Australia, Japan, and New Zealand. In an
even shorter time span—less than one hundred
years and in some cases fifty years—a similar
transition has also occurred in Greece, Ireland,
Portugal, Spain, South Korea, and Taiwan. In fact,
every part of the world has seen some transforma-
tion of a typical newborn’s life. In every region of
the world, the probability of a baby’s surviving to its
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first birthday has risen, life expectancy has risen,
and a child spends more time in school than his
ancestors did.
These improvements in general conditions of
well-being are mirrored in more pedestrian mea-
sures of possessions. Although beginning work at
age nine, an average American born in 1850 did not
have much in the way of material possessions: He
could expect to benefit from only about $5,000 dol-
lars of output per worker (in 1985 dollars). The aver-
age output per worker in 1999 was over nine times
as high: $46,000 (in 1985 dollars). These measures
of living standards are abstract because they mea-
sure a person’s command of goods and services in
general. A less abstract measure of a person’s com-
mand of goods and services is the number of hours
a person must work to accumulate the income to
buy specific goods and services.
People acquire many more goods today for far
less time spent working than in the past. Although
the data to make such comparisons are not available
as far back as 1850, comparisons with 1919 are pos-
sible for some goods. In 1919, a worker in the
United States worked nine and a half hours, on
average, to purchase a dozen grocery items. By
1997, the typical worker worked only about one and
a half hours to purchase the same groceries. Based
on a forty-hour workweek, a year and a half of work
was necessary to buy a refrigerator in 1919, and less
than two weeks of work was necessary in 1997. In
Every day in every way, it’s getting better and better.
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Overall Improvements in Living Standards
When I change my living standard and I move
uptown . . . 
—Janis Joplin (Bye, Bye Baby)
L
ong-term comparisons show the substantial
improvements in living standards that have
occurred everywhere.
Measures of living standards. Living stan-
dard, defined by the Oxford Concise Dictionary
as “the degree of material comfort available to a
person or class or community,” may seem too vague
a concept for making comparisons between the
United States and Great Britain, let alone the
United States and, say, Uruguay. Even so, there are
ways of estimating people’s living standard and
changes in it. Three of these measures are life
expectancy, infant survival rates, and income per
worker. While not the only ways to compare living
standards, these measures do represent people’s
ability to sustain life and buy goods and services.
Life expectancy at birth is an estimate of the
number of years that a newborn will live given cur-
rent mortality rates.4 Life expectancies vary sub-
stantially around the world. For example, in 1999,
Japan had the longest life expectancy, eighty years,
and Sierra Leone had the shortest, thirty-eight years.
The infant survival rate is the number of infants
who survive to one year of age per one thousand
births.5 Because infants are particularly susceptible
to catastrophic events in their environment, such as
famines, a higher survival rate indicates better care
and a more supportive environment for children
and implies less grief for parents. Like life expect-
ancy, infant survival rates vary substantially across
countries and have improved over time. In 1999,
the highest infant survival rate was 99.6 percent
in Finland, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, and
Singapore, and the lowest survival rate was 83.1 per-
cent in Sierra Leone. These rates are noticeably
higher than earlier ones. An infant survival rate of
67.7 percent in Mexico in 1910 is the lowest rate in
the data underlying this article.
Real income per person is a measure of the
average person’s living standard because people
with higher incomes can buy more, at least if
prices do not change. Because inflation—an increase
in overall prices—does happen frequently, the
appropriate measure of income is real income:
income adjusted for overall changes in the level of
prices. Real income per person is a measure of
how much a typical person can buy given the
average income in the economy. If real income per
person rises over time in a country, then the typi-
1919, purchasing a Ford Model T, the first mass-
produced “affordable” car, required almost one and
a half years of work. By 1997, buying a Ford Taurus
required working less than eight months.1
Measured by the goods people own, living stan-
dards are higher for people today. Eighty-five per-
cent of households in the United States did not have
flush toilets in 1900. Less than 1 percent of house-
holds did not have complete indoor plumbing in
2000. Four out of nine households owned a refrig-
erator in 1940; virtually every household had one by
1960. One out of seven households had air condi-
tioning in 1960; almost three-fourths had air condi-
tioning in 2000. Color television was in four out of
nine homes in 1970 and in virtually every home by
1990. Personal computers were in only one out of
six homes in 1990 but in over half the homes in the
United States ten years later.2 Other goods tell the
same story: People have far more goods today than
they had even in the recent past.
As with the trends in infant survival, life expec-
tancy, and education, this story of rising living stan-
dards in the United States is repeated in other parts
of the world. Over the last fifty years or more, every
region in the world has seen a transformation of its
living standards.3 Some regions have experienced a
longer period of sustained growth, and others have
more recently entered into an era of growth.
This improvement in living standards is not,
however, invariable. Some parts of the world have
experienced declining living standards in the 1980s
and 1990s. Although these are bad times for the
millions of people in these areas, these people still
are better off than their ancestors forty or more
years removed. And the bad times will not neces-
sarily continue.
This article has two themes: (1) Economic
growth has improved the lives of all people com-
pared to those of their ancestors. (2) Economic
decline over the past few decades applies to only a
few regions and is unusual in the history of the
world since 1800.
Rising real income throughout the world
since the mid-1800s has been termed mod-
ern economic growth because increases in
real income per worker that continue for
decades were uncommon in earlier centuries.47 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
cal person in that country can buy more goods
and services.
Real income per worker, used in this article, is
closely related to real income per person and gen-
erally changes in the same direction. The number of
workers is more directly related to the quantity of
goods and services produced in an economy than is
population. This article uses the terms real income
per worker and output per worker interchangeably
because real income and output are the same thing
in standard National Income Accounting.
Changes in real income per worker, although
more abstract than changes in life expectancy and
infant survival rate, are an excellent summary mea-
sure of growth in people’s well-being. For example,
real income per worker grew by 2 percent per year
in the Western Countries (see the appendix) from
1950 to 1999 and by 1.6 percent per year in Latin
America. Real income per worker in 1999 (in 1985
dollars) was $40,398 in the Western Countries and
$11,061 in Latin America.6 These figures indicate
that living standards have been increasing and that
in 1999 they were higher in the Western Countries
than in Latin America.
The data on real income used in this article were
not previously available in computer-readable form
suitable for analysis (Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura
2002). These data on 145 countries cover 98 percent
of the world in 1999, extend back before 1900 for
twenty-four countries, and include education and
experience for the workforce in all of the countries.
The countries are grouped into nine regions
because it is easier to see developments for a few
regions than for 145 individual countries. The regions
are the Western Countries (which includes most of
Northern Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Canada,
and the United States), Southern Europe, Central
and Eastern Europe, the Newly Industrialized
Countries (NICs), Asia, the Middle East, Northern
Africa, Sub-Saharan Africa, and Latin America.7
Because there are large differences in the sizes of the
countries, equally weighting every country in a region
would misrepresent the experience of the typical per-
son in a region. To avoid this problem, this analysis
presents weighted averages for each country in a
region, with the weight being the country’s share
of the region’s labor force in 1999.8
Life expectancy at birth. Figure 1 shows that life
expectancy at birth was higher in 1999 than in the
past in each of the nine regions. Since the early
1800s, life expectancy in the Western Countries has
increased from less than forty years to seventy-seven
1. See Table A1 in the appendix for more information on the falling real cost of consumption items. The lone exception in the
table is tuition at the University of Texas—payment for a service. Although higher education has become more expensive
since the middle 1970s, higher earnings for college-educated workers compared to high school graduates more than com-
pensates for the higher tuition.
2. More details on the rise in living standards in the United States are contained in Table A2 in the appendix.
3. Tables A3 and A4 in the appendix provide information for twelve European countries and the United States on household
ownership of a variety of durable goods: clothes washers, clothes dryers, dishwashers, refrigerators, color televisions, video
cassette recorders, personal computers, and automobiles. 
For most of the items and most of the years, the United States leads this group in material ownership, but there is con-
vergence in many if not all of the goods. Even the poorest countries in the group—Poland, Romania, and Russia—have expe-
rienced substantial increases in the ownership of these consumer durables. Table A5 in the appendix shows that ownership
of these items has increased in other countries as well.
4. The life-expectancy data in this article are from various issues of the World Development Report, produced annually by the World
Bank; Keyfitz and Fleiger (1968, 1990); Keyfitz, Preston, and Schoen (1972); and the U.S. Department of Commerce (1975).
5. The infant survival rate can have a large effect on life expectancy because in some countries this survival rate is roughly
80 percent, dramatically lowering average life expectancy. Nonetheless, this correlation is less important in recent years. The
data on infant survival are from the same sources as life expectancy data.
6. These dollars are adjusted for purchasing-power parity (PPP). One obvious way to measure real income per worker is to con-
vert income per worker in local currency to dollars based on current market exchange rates and then convert the income in
current dollars to real income. The presence of nontraded goods and services, however, implies that market exchange rates
do not reflect the value of all goods and services across countries. For example, the prices of nontraded services such as hair-
cuts and taxi rides in higher-income countries typically are higher than in lower-income countries. A more accurate method
is to convert income into dollars using PPP exchange rates, which value goods and services at U.S. dollar prices rather than
at exchange-rate-adjusted local currency prices. 
7. The appendix lists the countries in the regions. Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2002, appendix) summarize information on the
individual countries.
8. The figures can show estimates of either the level or the growth rate of the variables, but not both. The figures for output,
aggregate input, and total factor productivity (TFP) show growth rates. (Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura 2002 provide details on
how these figures were calculated.) The levels themselves are of substantial interest for life expectancy and infant mortality,
so weighted averages of the levels are used at the risk of some distortion over time.48 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
Western Countries 99.4 percent of babies born in
1999 survived to their first birthday, and 96.6 per-
cent born in 1950 survived for a year.
In recent years, infant survival rates have
increased more uniformly than has life expectancy.
No regions have falling infant survival rates in recent
decades even though life expectancy has been flat
for fifty years in Central and Eastern Europe and
declined from 1990 to 1999 in Sub-Saharan Africa. 
Income per worker. For every region of the world,
real income per worker was higher in 1999 than in the
first year for which we have data for that region.
Figure 3 shows real income per worker for the nine
regions. The figure’s vertical scale is proportional,
which means that the slopes of the lines from one date
to another are growth rates of real income. The rising
real income throughout the world during this period
has been termed modern economic growth because
increases in real income per worker that continue for
decades were uncommon in earlier centuries.
Economic growth is not inevitable, though, even
in the modern period. For instance, real income per
years in 1999. Life expectancy in every other region
of the world has increased as well, generally more
rapidly than in the Western Countries. This higher
life expectancy is a result of better nutrition, improved
health care, and improved sanitation.
Despite these impressive increases in life expec-
tancy, two regions experienced stagnant or falling
life expectancy in recent decades. Central and East-
ern Europe had a stagnant life expectancy of about
seventy years from 1960 to 1990 and falling life
expectancy from 1990 to 1999. The decrease in life
expectancy in Sub-Saharan Africa from fifty-two
years in 1990 to fifty years in 1999 is striking and is
at least partly related to deaths from AIDS.
Infant survival rates. Infant survival rates also
have improved for every region over the entire period
covered by the data. Figure 2 shows the regional
infant survival rates per thousand live births by
region. In the region with the lowest survival rate,
Sub-Saharan Africa, 91 percent of babies born in
1999 survived to their first birthday compared to
































































Life Expectancy at Birth
Sources: World Bank, World Development Report (various years); Keyfitz and Fleiger (1968, 1990); Keyfitz, Preston, and Schoen (1972); and
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worker in the Western Countries was lower in 1920
than in 1910. More recently, real income per worker
in the Middle East was lower in 1999 than in 1980.
Latin America’s real income per worker declined
from 1980 to 1990 and then rebounded somewhat
from 1990 to 1999. In Sub-Saharan Africa, real
income per worker dropped 13 percent from 1980
to 1999. Perhaps not surprisingly given the turmoil
associated with the downfall of Communism, mea-
sured real income per worker in Central and Eastern
Europe fell from 1990 to 1999.
Clearly, most people in the world today are bet-
ter off than people living fifty or one hundred years
ago. Figure 3 shows that although real income in
some regions has fallen during the last twenty to
thirty years, these decreases are atypical. These
decreases in real income are correlated with, and
possibly caused, shorter life expectancies.
It is relatively straightforward to gain some
understanding of why these decreases in real
income have occurred. Real income per worker can
decrease for only two reasons: (1) declines in the
physical and human capital per worker available to
produce output or (2) declines in productivity per
worker. Are the decreases in real income per worker
observed in these data associated with declines in
physical and human capital, in productivity, or in
both? The answer to this question, while not com-
plete, provides clues to the underlying reasons.
Aggregate Inputs and Productivity
You don’t get something for nothing.
—Neil Peart (Something for Nothing,
performed by Rush, music by Geddy Lee)
W
hat explains these changes in living standards?
A useful start is to examine changes in the
resources available for production as well as produc-
tivity. The services of physical capital and of the labor
force—including the effects of its education, training,
and experience—can be summarized as aggregate
input. By definition, the growth in output per worker
that is not explicable by growth in aggregate input








































































































Sources: World Bank, World Development Report (various years); Keyfitz and Fleiger (1968, 1990); Keyfitz, Preston, and Schoen (1972); and
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and TFP growth reflects everything else. “Everything
else” includes a great many events. Events that have
positive effects on TFP growth include improve-
ments in the stock of physical capital that are not
associated with higher market prices, for example,
improvements in personal computers in the last
twenty years; gains in knowledge that are not associ-
ated with more schooling, for example, improved
knowledge of building semiconductors; and changes
in government regulations that enhance the opera-
tions of markets, for example, clearer enforcement of
property rights. Events that have negative effects on
TFP growth include investment in capital stock that
has no useful purpose, for example, building a road in
the middle of nowhere; decreases in the amount
learned per year of time in school, for example, time
spent in school with no pencils, paper, or other
resources (Easterly 2001, 288–89); and changes in
government regulations that impede the operations
of markets, for example, government grants of
monopoly rights to some individuals.
TFP per worker in Figure 5 does not grow as
rapidly as real income per worker or aggregate
input per worker. The slower growth of TFP per
worker than real income per worker reflects the
(TFP).9 How much of the growth in output per worker
is associated with growth in aggregate input, and how
much is associated with growth in productivity?
Aggregate input in the regions. Aggregate
input has been an important contributor to the
growth of output per worker. Figure 4 shows that
measured aggregate input almost uniformly increases
for every region. The only exception to this pattern
is a decade of virtually no change in aggregate
input from 1840 to 1850 for the Western Countries.
Increases in education, experience, and physical
capital are an important part of the explanation of
the growth of real income per worker, and TFP is
not the major source of the growth of income per
worker over longer time periods.10
Even so, fluctuations in physical and human cap-
ital cannot explain the evident decreases in real
income per worker in Latin America and other
regions in Figure 3. These decreases must be due to
declines in TFP.
Productivity in the regions. Figure 5 shows the
growth of TFP for the regions. Growth of TFP is the
growth of output per worker that is not due to
growth of aggregate input. Aggregate input growth













































































































Real Income per Worker
Source: Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2002)9. In this analysis, it is assumed that the relationship between output and resources can be summarized by an aggregate produc-
tion function, which can be written
(1) Y(t) = A(t)F[K(t), H(t)],
where Y(t), K(t), and H(t) are output, physical capital, and human capital, respectively, at time t and the parameter A(t) repre-
sents the level of TFP at time t. Writing the production function this way restricts changes in the production function to Hicks-
neutral changes in TFP. If social marginal products equal private ones and there is perfect competition, equation (1) implies that
(2) a = y – αk – (1 – α)h,
where α is capital’s share of income and a lowercase letter denotes the growth rate of a variable per worker. The growth rate
of aggregate input is defined by i = αk + (1 – α)h. While the factor shares, α and 1 – α, generally vary over time, we assume
that such variation is relatively unimportant. The growth rate of TFP per worker, a, in equation (2) is a residual computed
from the other variables, which are observable. Equation (2) is used to estimate the growth rate of TFP per worker as well
as the variation in its growth over time and across countries.
10. Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2002) provide more analysis and support for this assertion.
11. The growth rate of output per worker equals the growth rate of aggregate input per worker plus the growth rate of TFP
per worker.
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growth of aggregate input per worker.11 The slower
growth of TFP per worker than aggregate input per
worker reflects the large contribution of aggregate
input growth to the growth of output per worker
(Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura 2002).
Figure 5 also shows that the growth of TFP per
worker is bumpier than the growth of real income
per worker in Figure 3. TFP shows an overall
upward trend in the Western Countries in the
1900s. On the other hand, Latin America, North
Africa, Central and Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan
Africa, Southern Europe, and the Middle East all
recorded decreases in TFP in recent decades. In









































































































Source: Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2002)52 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
1999, resulting in a TFP per worker about 42 per-
cent lower in 1999 than in 1970.
Recent Reversals in Income and 
Total Factor Productivity
Looks like we’re in for nasty weather.
—John Fogerty (Bad Moon Rising, 
performed by Creedence Clearwater Revival)
W
hat explains these reversals of the patterns of
modern economic growth? Falling real income
per worker and even more rapidly falling TFP char-
acterize the recent history of Latin America,
Central and Eastern Europe, Sub-Saharan Africa,
and the Middle East. Are these decreases in real
income per worker and TFP a harbinger of the
future, or are they a temporary setback in the
course of modern economic growth? It is impossible
to provide a definitive answer to this question.
Nonetheless, we can combine our data with the
available literature to draw informed inferences
about the reasons for the recent reversals.
Latin America. From 1900 to 1980, the growth
rate of output per worker in Latin America was
roughly the same as the growth rate of output per
worker in the Western Countries. From 1980 to 1990,
These declines in TFP are often, but not always,
associated with decreases in income. The decrease
in TFP in Latin America at a 2.2 percent rate from
1980 to 1999 is associated with real income falling
at a 0.8 percent rate; TFP continued to fall from
1990 to 1999 at a 0.5 percent rate, but income per
worker increased at the relatively slow rate of 0.6 per-
cent per year.
The decrease in TFP in North Africa since 1980
reflects precipitous drops in TFP in three countries:
Egypt, Libya, and Morocco. The ratios of TFP in
1999 to TFP in 1980 are 56.3 percent for Egypt,
48.2 percent for Libya, and 61.3 percent for
Morocco. These decreases in TFP make it all the
more remarkable that income per worker in the
region rose over the same period.
Central and Eastern Europe includes Russia,
countries that were part of the Soviet Union, and
countries that were Soviet satellites, such as Poland.
Since the demise of the Soviet Union, TFP growth has
fallen quite dramatically in this region. The decrease
in TFP in the region since 1990 has been concen-
trated in Russia and the Ukraine, which together
make up about 50 percent of the region’s labor force.
Sub-Saharan Africa experienced a precipitous































































































































Note: The TFP values for the Middle East are 1950, 183.73; 1960, 243.05; 1970, 279.72; 1980, 234.17; 1990, 160.82; 199, 107.45.
These values exceed the range of this graph and therefore are not shown.
Source: Baier, Dwyer, and Tamura (2002)12. Sachs and Larrain (1993) and Cardoso and Dornbusch (1989) argue that import substitution policies, along with external
shocks, were the causes of the debt crisis in Latin America. Taking a different view, Rodrik (1998) argues that there is no
direct link between import substitution policies and the poor Latin American performance in the 1980s. Bauer (1972) argues
that import substitution is bound to lead to the problems confronted by Latin America.
13. Dooley (1995) discusses why the commercial banks in developed countries were more willing to loan funds to develop-
ing countries.
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however, output per worker for the average person
in the Latin American countries fell. What led to
this “lost decade” of the 1980s for Latin America,
and will this pattern continue?
A set of economic policies called import substitu-
tion is often cited as the main cause of Latin America’s
problems in the 1980s. These policies had large nega-
tive effects on economic growth in the 1980s in
response to developments in the 1970s and 1980s.12
Import substitution encourages consumption of
domestically manufactured goods over imported
goods by placing high tariffs or small quotas on
imported goods that compete with domestic
industries. Entry into these industries is encour-
aged, which results in an inefficient allocation of
resources and resulted in overcapacity in many
industries in Latin America. The lack of competi-
tion provides little incentive for the industries to
produce goods efficiently, and import substitution
policies can result in large government bureaucra-
cies to pick the winners and provide credit. In
Latin America, the expenditures to provide credit
worsened very large government deficits at the
same time that low real interest rates designed to
encourage investment also discouraged domestic
saving. Instead of providing funds to local indus-
tries or the government, people either consumed
more or invested their funds abroad at higher
interest rates. 
From 1950 to 1980, import substitution policies
had little success in transforming Latin American
countries into exporters of manufactured goods.
The problems caused by these policies did not have
a noticeable effect on growth, however, until exter-
nal shocks occurred in the 1970s and 1980s. In the
1970s, oil prices increased dramatically, and the cur-
rent accounts for the oil-importing countries in Latin
America went into deficit. Funds to finance these
current-account deficits were available in the 1970s
from the oil-exporting countries. Most of the devel-
oped world was in a period of slow economic growth,
and more credit was extended to many of the gov-
ernments in Latin America.13 These loans were dol-
lar denominated at initially low but variable interest
rates, but these low rates did not continue forever.
Higher interest rates in the United States and
other countries at the end of the 1970s raised the
interest rates on Latin American debt, thereby mak-
ing it more difficult for Latin American countries to
service their debt. By 1982, fears of default slowed or
reversed foreign purchases of Latin American debt,
and Latin American countries monetized government
deficits that could no longer be financed abroad. This
monetization led to collapses of exchange rates and
higher inflation in many countries.
Conditions worsened in the 1980s. As concerns
about default increased, average annual inflation
rose dramatically from 1980 to 1985. The economic
distortions associated with increases in inflation are
severe (Lucas 2000). Real wages fell, leading to
more social unrest. These factors all contributed to
the fall in output and the designation of the 1980s
in Latin America as “the lost decade.” 
In sum, import substitution policies are not the
sole reason for the lost decade, but they are a major
contributing factor. The higher price of crude oil
created a bad situation for these countries. The
import substitution polices deserve the blame,
though, for making a bad situation worse.
Since 1990, several attempts have been made to
mitigate the problems associated with Latin America’s
large external debt. Some of the reforms in the 1990s
had no impact or were undone soon after they were
introduced. For example, the Argentinean govern-
ment recently defaulted on its domestically held debt.
Whether all of Latin America will return to more con-
tinuous economic growth remains to be seen.
Central and Eastern Europe. The region
called Central and Eastern Europe includes the
countries that have developed from the collapse of
the Soviet Empire, some of which always were inde-
pendent countries to some extent, such as Hungary,
Once modern economic growth—consistent
increases in output, input, and productivity
per worker—begins, it tends to continue on
a regular basis and improve people’s lives.54 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
That said, the presence or absence of institutions
that support a market economy is an important part
of the explanation of the behavior of output since the
collapse of the Soviet Union.17 The institutions in
place in various countries at the beginning of the
transition differed substantially across countries. For
example, during the entire period after World War II,
farmers in Poland owned the land they farmed.
Farmers in most other planned economies worked on
collective farms nominally owned by the farmers, but
they had no property rights in the sense of rights to
use the land as they wished or to transfer the land.
As a result of these different property rights, Poland’s
farmers experienced a much less disruptive transi-
tion to a market economy than did farmers in Russia
and most other Soviet satellites.
Central and Eastern European countries have also
differed in the rate at which they have adopted insti-
tutions to support a market economy. Some countries,
such as the Czech Republic and Latvia, are seeking to
join the European Union in the next few years. At the
same time, some countries such as Belarus and
Turkmenistan still have command economies in place.
The most plausible explanation for the different
rates at which countries have adapted to market
economies is a simple one referred to by the evocative
phrase “market memory.”18 Countries that were inde-
pendent before the fall of the Soviet Union grew faster
after the collapse (Havrylyshyn and van Rooden
2000). Some of these countries, such as Poland and
Yugoslavia, had market economies before they had
planned economies, and many of the institutional
changes necessary to support a market economy were
merely returns to previous institutions. In other coun-
tries such as Russia, with no history of a market econ-
omy, there were no prior institutions to return to.19
Whereas Poland was partly reinstating Polish institu-
tions after throwing off foreign control, Russia had to
invent institutions new to that country.20
The transition to market economies has been rocky
in Central and Eastern Europe, but many countries
are completing that transition. The evidence suggests
that countries that have not already started on a path
of sustained growth, such as the Czech Republic and
Poland, will experience modern economic growth sim-
ilar to the Western Countries in the near future.
Sub-Saharan Africa. Real income per worker in
Sub-Saharan Africa has been falling since 1980. A
growth rate of –0.7 percent per year does not seem
like much of a fall, but it adds up over twenty years.
Output per worker in Sub-Saharan Africa in 1999 was
87 percent of its level in 1980. This decline in real
income is not due to a decrease in physical and human
capital used in production; it is associated with a dra-
and some of which were part of the Soviet Union,
such as the Ukraine. The common feature of these
countries is that each had a command economy
while it was part of the Soviet Empire. 
In one sense, the experiences of these countries
since the Soviet Union’s collapse from 1989 to 1991
have been surprising.14 Initially, output fell for all
the countries, and many had lower measured out-
put per worker in 1999 than in 1990.15 This pattern
raises the question: If a command economy is
worse at organizing production than a market
economy, why would output fall?16
Comparing output in a command economy and a
market economy is tricky because output in market
economies is measured at market prices. These
market prices reflect the amounts that buyers want
to buy and that producers want to produce and sell,
and these prices determine which people receive
the goods and services. The prices of goods and ser-
vices in a command economy have little or no rela-
tionship to the value people place on them or to the
quantities of the goods or services people receive.
As a result, without substantial adjustments to the
data, which our data lack, the data must be taken
with a grain of salt. Even so, it is unlikely that the 30
percent decrease in output per worker in Russia is
a statistical artifact.
After the fact, the initial decreases in output
are not too hard to explain. At first, the transition
from command economies to market economies
was extraordinarily disruptive. Even if all the insti-
tutions for supporting a market economy were
recognized and in place instantaneously, many
purchases and sales that occurred regularly in the
command economy no longer would occur. For
example, the demise of the Soviet Union was fol-
lowed by the collapse of the system for interna-
tional trade among those countries. As a result,
regular buyers for some goods and services found
it no longer worthwhile to buy the same goods as
before, and it took time for producers to adjust.
Output fell during this transition.
It is easy to overemphasize decreases in
income and productivity in various parts of
the world in the last ten or twenty years and
treat them as if they were typical.14. The Berlin Wall was opened by the government of East Germany on November 9, 1989, and the Soviet Union was formally
dissolved into sovereign republics on December 25, 1991 (Encyclopaedia Britannica 2003 Ultimate Reference Suite CD-ROM,
15th ed., s.v. “Berlin Wall,” “Communism”). Harrison (2002) provides a useful framework for thinking about the collapse.
15. More recent data, not included in this data set, show increases for more of the countries.
16. The World Bank (2002) and Campos and Coricelli (2002) summarize some of the research intended to answer this question.
17. In one sense, the lack of foresight about the importance of institutions is surprising. The economic analysis of law and property
rights has been an important, substantive part of economics for decades (Alchian 1965), and there is a well-known textbook
(Barzel 1997). Furthermore, economic historians and others have been analyzing institutions along related lines in the New
Institutional Economics (North 1990), and more general analyses of economic growth are beginning to recognize the impor-
tance of institutions (Easterly 2001). In another sense, the failure to recognize the importance of institutions is not surprising:
It takes time for innovations to take hold in economies, so why should it not take time in disciplines such as economics?
18. The International Monetary Fund (2000, chap. 3) provides a solid analysis.
19. For most of Russia’s history, the czar owned everyone and everything (Pipes 1999).
20. Poland’s situation points to another of North’s analyses, that of the importance of culture (North 1990).
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matic decrease in TFP. In 1999, TFP was 68 percent of
its level in 1980. In all of the regions, such a drop in liv-
ing standards and productivity is unprecedented.
Researchers have arrived at a general consensus
about Africa’s decline in living standard. Africa has
low rates of investment associated with low returns
on investment and poor fiscal policy, high barriers
to trade, and relatively little protection of private
property rights.
Rodrik (1999) shows that Sub-Saharan Africa has
higher tariff rates on all products from 1980 to 1990
relative to two other low-income regions—the Carib-
bean and East Asia—and has reduced these rates less
than all other regions. These tariffs are exacerbated
by larger government distortions in the foreign
exchange market (Easterly and Levine 1997).
Government corruption also is higher in Sub-
Saharan African countries compared with similar
countries (Collier and Gunning 1999). In addition,
ethnic heterogeneity, which can be associated with
civil wars and strife, is greater in Sub-Saharan
African countries than in any other region. Tamura
(2002) shows that Sub-Saharan Africa would have a
50 percent increase in living standards immediately
and possibly a six- to tenfold increase in living stan-
dards within twenty to thirty years if it eliminated
poor government policies in regulation, fiscal policy,
and trade policy.
Can government intervention help these coun-
tries grow, perhaps through international agencies?
It is clear that government policies can throttle
growth. It is less clear whether government policies
can promote growth. It is hard not to notice that the
period with the most abysmal growth in lower-
income countries such as the Sub-Saharan countries
is the period in which the most international aid was
given. That fact does not imply that the aid was
worse than useless: World events may have simply
thrown up more difficulties than in earlier periods.
On the other hand, individual projects examined by
Bauer (1972) and Easterly (2001) suggest that some
of the international aid, which generally is provided
as low-interest loans to be repaid by the country’s
citizens, has been misguided at best.
Population growth is often thought to be a major
problem in Sub-Saharan Africa. People in the region
do have a higher fertility rate and fewer years of
schooling than people in other parts of the world.
Tragically, Sub-Saharan Africa is more likely to have
a population implosion than a demographic transi-
tion or overpopulation. Sub-Saharan Africa has much
higher AIDS and HIV infection rates than any other
region in the world. Deaths from AIDS and HIV infec-
tion account for the declining life expectancy at birth
in the region between 1990 and 1999. The table
on page 24 shows the change in life expectancy
between 1990 and 1999 and HIV infection rates by
regions. A simple statistical estimate suggests that
the greater incidence of AIDS explains 80 to 90 per-
cent of the decrease in life expectancy at birth in
Sub-Saharan Africa from 1990 to 1999. Unless the
incidence of AIDS and HIV falls, life expectancy in
Sub-Saharan Africa will continue to drop.
The Middle East. Real income per worker in the
Middle East was lower in 1999 than in 1980. This
decrease reflects decreases in real income per worker
in two countries: Iran, which accounts for 41 per-
cent of the region’s labor force in the Middle East, and
Iraq, which accounts for 13 percent of the labor force.
These declines appear to be associated with political
regimes. The drop in real income in Iran occurred
after the Iranian Revolution, and the decrease in Iraq
was associated with Saddam Hussein’s regime. The
implications for the future are not obvious. As of this
writing, Saddam Hussein’s regime has fallen, but the
replacement government may be little different in
terms of economic policies, a command economy in
many respects, or it may be dramatically different—a
market economy. The regime in Iran may continue to
depress economic growth, or it may not. In some56 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
Why did some countries start growing at one
time and other countries at different times? No one
knows the answer to that question. Evidence on
this question has not been discussed for a good rea-
son: There is a great deal of conjecture but little
empirical basis for firm conclusions about why
countries begin to grow.
Even so, it is fair to say that economic growth had
spread around the world by the 1950s, with the pos-
sible exception of Sub-Saharan Africa. We can also
say that economic growth such as that enjoyed by
people in the Western Countries is typical and has
been for some time. Output, input, and productivity
per worker generally have been increasing even if at
different rates than in the Western Countries.
It is easy to overemphasize decreases in income
and productivity in various regions in the last ten or
twenty years and treat them as if they were typical.
Fortunately, the decreases in Central and Eastern
Europe are likely to be transitory. Whether the recent
problems in the Middle East, primarily Iraq and Iran,
and Latin America are transitory is still uncertain.
Sub-Saharan Africa is a different case, not just in
terms of the low level of income itself but also in
terms of growth. With the exception of South
Africa, these countries show little evidence of
increasing productivity per worker in the available
data. It is not clear that modern economic growth
ever began in Sub-Saharan Africa. Unfortunately for
this region, these countries provide more evidence
about how government policies can throttle eco-
nomic growth than about how to encourage it, let
alone jump-start it.
ways, the situation in these two countries is similar to
that in Eastern Europe before the fall of the Soviet
Union. The strains are evident; the implications and
possible results of the strains are far from certain.
TFP in every Middle Eastern country began
falling before the region’s real income per worker
declined. TFP dropped in every country in the
region, not just a few of them. These decreases may
be partly associated with drops in oil prices, but
that cannot be the whole story. Israel, which pro-
duces no crude oil, experienced little change in TFP
from 1970 to 1999. The decreases in the other
Middle Eastern countries during that period have
not been uniform, and the falls have been precipi-
tous in some countries. The largest decrease in TFP
during the 1970–99 period has been in Yemen, with
TFP falling 84 percent, and the second largest
decrease in Saudi Arabia, with TFP falling 81 per-
cent. These trends are partly a result of falling
crude oil prices, but economic policies and the
armed conflicts and unrest in the region also have
been important influences.
Conclusion
But I still haven’t found what I’m looking for.
—U2
O
nce modern economic growth—consistent
increases in output, input, and productivity per
worker—begins, it tends to continue on a regular
basis and improve people’s lives. This is consistent
with the world’s experience in the nineteenth and
twentieth centuries.
TABLE 
Life Expectancy and AIDS/HIV Infection Rates by Region
Change in life AIDS/HIV infection
expectancy, rates, 1999
1990–99 (years) (% of population)
Western Countries 2.32 0.39
Southern Europe 2.78 0.27
Central and Eastern Europe –1.02 0.22
Newly Industrialized Countries 4.04 0.03
Asia 2.39 0.35
Middle East 3.36 0.02
Northern Africa 4.97 0.03
Sub-Saharan Africa –1.35 8.38
Latin America 1.78 0.60
Note: The changes in life expectancies and the infection rates are averages using 1999 labor force data.
Sources: Life expectancy data from the World Bank’s World Development Report (various years). HIV infection rate data from the World
Bank’s World Development Report (2001), with the following exceptions: Puerto Rico data from <hardtruth.qti.net/map/PR.htm>;
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T
he underlying data used in this article are by
country, but, for convenience, data are sum-
marized by world regions. The countries in each
region are determined by judgment based on sim-
ilarity of growth patterns and geographic coher-
ence. The countries in each region are
Western Countries: Austria, Belgium, Denmark,
Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, the Nether-
lands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United
Kingdom, Canada, the United States, Australia,
and New Zealand
Southern Europe: Cyprus, Greece, Italy, Portu-
gal, Spain, and Turkey
Central and Eastern Europe: Albania, Armenia,
Azerbaijan, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East
Germany, Estonia, Georgia, Hungary, Kazakhstan,
Kyrgystan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland,
Romania, Russia, the Slovak Republic, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Yugoslavia
Newly Industrialized Countries: Hong Kong,
Japan, (South) Korea, Singapore, and Taiwan
Asia: Bangladesh, Cambodia, China, Fiji, India,
Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, Myanmar, Nepal,
Pakistan, Papua New Guinea, the Philippines, Sri
Lanka, Thailand, and Vietnam
Middle East: Iran, Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait,
Oman, Saudi Arabia, Syria, United Arab Emirates,
and Yemen
Northern Africa: Algeria, Egypt, Libya, Morocco,
and Tunisia
Sub-Saharan Africa: Angola, Benin, Botswana,
Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, the Central
African Republic, Chad, Congo, Ethiopia, Gabon,
Gambia (The), Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau,
Ivory Coast, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Madagascar,
Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mozambique,
Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra
Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Tanzania,
Togo, Uganda, Zaire, Zambia, and Zimbabwe
Latin America: Argentina, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile,
Colombia, Costa Rica, the Dominican Republic,
Ecuador, El Salvador, Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti,
Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama,
Paraguay, Peru, Puerto Rico, Trinidad, Uruguay,
and Venezuela
APPENDIX
Looking at the Data by Region
TABLE A1
Work Time (Hours) Needed to Purchase Consumer Items in the United States
1919 1930 1950 1970 1997
Dozen grocery items 9.5 6.8 3.5 2 1.6
Man’s suit — 79 — 49 40
Range 345a — 292 113 22
Clothes washer 553b — 138c 72 26
Clothes dryer — 553d 118 57 26
Refrigerator 3,162 — — 112 68
Coast-to-coast flight — 366 71 — 16
Color television — — 562e 174 23
VCR — — — 365 15
Microwave oven — — 2,467f 176g 15
Ford automobile 4,696h — 1,638 — 1,365
Square feet of new home 7.8 — 6.5i — 5.6
University of Texas tuition — 125 80 80 200
Pneumonia carej 579k ——— 1 . 8
aFor 1910. bFor 1911. cFor 1956. dFor 1940. eFor 1954. fFor 1947. gFor 1967. hFor 1908. iFor 1955. jFrom Forbes, September 1992.
kFor funeral.
Note: The cost of items is measured as the number of hours that a typical person had to work to purchase the items.
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APPENDIX (continued)
TABLE A2
Rising Material Living Standards in the United States
1900 1940 1950 1960 1970 1980 1990 2000
Homes — 44 55 62 63 64 66 67
Homes without complete plumbing 85 72 60 30 15 5 <1 <1
Clothes washer 5 — — 41 60 75 76 78
Clothes dryer — — — 17 42 62 69 71
Air conditioning — — — 15 37 55 68 72
Dishwasher — — — 7 26 35 45 54
Microwave oven —————1 07 98 3
Range — — — 37 56 70 99 99
Refrigerator 18 44 80 98 100 100 100 100
Color television ————4 29 09 99 9
V C R ————— 1 . 18 89 7
Personal computer ——————1 66 4
Automobile — — 59 77 82 83 84 93
Note: The table shows the percentage of households owning an item.
Sources: U.S. Department of Commerce, Statistical Abstract of the United States (various years), with the following exceptions: plumb-
ing, clothes washers, and refrigerators for 1900, Lebergott (1984); color televisions and VCRs for 2000, New York Times Almanac
(2003); automobiles for 1950–70, U.S. Department of Commerce, Historical Statistics of the United States: Colonial Times to 1970
(1975).
TABLE A3
Share of Households Owning Major Appliances
1970 1980 1990 2000
Clothes washer
Belgium 57 71 88 89
Denmark 42 56 76 78
France 68 79 88 98
G e r m a n y 7 98 98 89 8
Greece 30 74 85
Italy 51 94 96 98
Netherlands 85 85 91 96
Poland — 14 40 51
Romania — — — 5
Russia — — — 11
Spain 58 79 87 82
United Kingdom 73 77 78 94
United States 60 75 76 77
Clothes dryer
Belgium — — 19 27
Denmark — — 22 43
France — — 12 26
Germany — 8 17 39
Greece — — — 7
Italy — — 10 17
Netherlands — — 23 58
Poland — — — 3
Romania — — — 0.4
Russia — — — 1
Spain — — — 6
United Kingdom — 38 42 54
United States 42 62 69 7159 Federal Reserve Bank of Atlanta ECONOMIC REVIEW Third Quarter 2003
TABLE A3 (continued)
Share of Households Owning Major Appliances
1970 1980 1990 2000
Dishwasher
Belgium 7 12 26 44
Denmark 4 20 26 47
France 4 17 33 36
Germany 5 22 34 58
Greece — — 11 21
Italy 3 18 18 33
Netherlands 3 12 12 40
Poland — — — 2
Romania — — — 1
Russia — — — 3
Spain 2 10 11 23
United Kingdom 2 4 11 26
United States 26 35 45 50
Refrigerator
Belgium 56 91 — 100
Denmark 76 96 — 97
France 74 94 — 85
Germany 80 95 — 87
Greece 32 67 — 88
Italy 64 92 — 85
Netherlands 66 96 — 99
Poland — 79 — 99
Romania — 25 — 74
Russia — 65 — 86
Spain 50 83 — 87
United Kingdom 60 93 — 99
United States 100 100 100 100
Source: Euromonitor (various years)
TABLE A4
Share of Households Owning Home Electronics and Automobiles
1970 1980 1990 2000
Color television
Belgium 4 51 — 99
Denmark — 65 — 92
France 3 48 — 96
Germany 11 66 — 97
Greece — 3 — 91
Italy — 30 — 95
Netherlands 12 64 — 98
Poland — — — 82
Romania — — — 50
Russia — — — 80
Spain — 31 — 98
United Kingdom 4 69 — 98
United States 42 90 99 99
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APPENDIX (continued)
TABLE A4 (continued)
Share of Households Owning Home Electronics and Automobiles
1970 1980 1990 2000
VCR
Belgium — 3 42 74
Denmark — 3 39 84
France — 1 35 61
Germany — 3 42 66
Greece — — 37 44
Italy — 0.4 25 68
Netherlands — 3 48 78
Poland — — — 75
Romania — — — 5
Russia — — — 13
Spain — 0.2 40 66
United Kingdom — 2 58 87
United States — 1.1 88 97
Personal computer
Belgium — — 11 46
Denmark — — 14 66
France — — 14 35
G e r m a n y ——1 64 8
Greece — — 6 13
Italy — — 12 22
Netherlands — — 20 65
Poland — — — 17
Romania — — — 3
Russia — — — 7
Spain — — 8 20
United Kingdom — — 14 41
United States — — 16 56
Automobile
Belgium 48 50 — 78
Denmark 63 61 — 71
France 59 68 — 79
Germany 53 66 — 89
Greece 11 19 — 56
Italy 44 72 — 76
Netherlands 49 69 — 70
Poland — 17 — 54
Romania — 3 — 17
Russia — 10 — 40
Spain 34 37 — 73
United Kingdom 61 56 — 73
United States 82 83 84 93
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TABLE A5
Ownership of Goods around the World in 2000
Clothes Clothes Color Personal
washer dryer Dishwasher Refrigerator television VCR computer Car
Algeria 6 2 3 76 69 8 4 26
Argentina 49 7 14 83 88 35 23 56
Brazil 24 2 6 82 86 18 24 41
Chile 45 7 2 61 59 30 18 42
China 2 1 1 6 45 1 14 3
Egypt 4 2 0 70 46 7 2 10
India 4 1 1 12 30 2 1 1
Indonesia 5 1 1 24 46 2 1 4
Japan 99 34 54 97 99 77 35 81
Jordan 9 2 6 66 91 27 9 27
Malaysia 80 26 2 97 90 67 24 64
Mexico 40 5 6 67 89 37 7 22
Nigeria 2 1 2 40 47 3 12 0
Pakistan 2 1 3 16 34 1 2 5
Philippines 8 6 1 38 63 22 2 8
South Africa 22 3 16 78 63 28 7 8
South Korea 68 32 3 98 92 68 27 44
Taiwan 94 22 4 99 99 58 31 51
Thailand 5 2 1 68 80 44 7 36
Tunisia 24 2 7 68 86 14 9 18
United States 78 71 54 100 99 97 64 93
Venezuela 38 5 3 80 90 28 10 47
Note: The table shows the percentage of households in the country owning the item in 2000.
Source: Euromonitor (various years).
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